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exeCutive SummaRy
As charter schools continue their rapid expansion in America’s cities, questions related to equitable access to these 
schools of choice have jumped to the forefront of the policy conversation. Indeed, the proportion of students in char-
ters with classifications that suggest that they are difficult to educate—such as students with disabilities, those who 
are not proficient in English, and those who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch—is often substantially below 
their respective proportions in traditional (“district”) public schools.
Policymakers have considered various interventions to increase access to charters for disadvantaged students, includ-
ing imposing strict quotas. However, another, less heavy-handed, approach holds particular promise: simplifying the 
charter-application process. In most cities, students apply to each charter school individually. This process imposes 
informational and other costs that are often more challenging for disadvantaged parents. Some cities have recently 
adopted “common-enrollment” systems for their charter and district schools that centralize and simplify the enroll-
ment process—by requiring parents to list their school preferences on a single application form—and better match 
students with their preferred school with an advanced algorithm.
This paper uses longitudinal data from Denver to measure whether adoption of common enrollment increased the 
proportion of disadvantaged students enrolled in that city’s charter elementary schools. It finds that Denver’s adop-
tion of common enrollment substantially increased the proportion of students enrolling in charter kindergartens who 
are minority, eligible for free/reduced-priced lunch, or speak English as a second language. Importantly, this paper 
considers only one specific effect of common enrollment on the charter-school sector. While policymakers should 
take a more expansive measure of the merits of common enrollment before adopting it, this paper suggests that an 
effective way to boost disadvantaged students’ enrollment in charters is to make applying to them easier.
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Marcus A. Winters
NaRRowiNg 
the ChaRteR-
eNRollmeNt gap
DeNveR’S CommoN- 
eNRollmeNt SyStem
INTRODUCTION
Charter-school students are less likely to be eligible for free/reduced-price lunches, to speak English as a second lan-guage (ESL), or to have a disability than are students in surrounding district schools. In a series of recent papers, 
this author used student enrollment data to examine why this is so: 
contrary to conventional wisdom, such differences in student pop-
ulations have little to do with disadvantaged students being more 
likely to leave charters than traditional public schools; instead, they 
are a product of disadvantaged students being less likely to apply 
to—and enroll—in charters. How might policymakers narrow this 
enrollment gap? 
Replacing traditional “school-based” enrollment systems (where par-
ents who wish their kids to attend a public school other than their 
default district school must complete separate applications for each 
extra school to which they apply) with common-enrollment systems 
(where parents need only complete a single application listing their 
school preferences) might reduce informational and other costs as-
sociated with applying to charters. The public school districts of 
Denver, New Orleans, Newark (N.J.), and Washington, D.C., have 
all recently adopted common enrollment and have included char-
ters in their application forms. Other cities, including Boston, De-
troit, Chicago, Oakland, and Indianapolis, are considering adopting 
common enrollment, too.1 New York City and Boston currently use 
common enrollment for some grades but do not include charters in 
their application forms.
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This paper measures the effect of Denver’s move, 
from school-based enrollment to common enroll-
ment that includes charters, on disadvantaged stu-
dents’—defined as those who are ethnic minorities, 
low-income, bilingual/ESL speakers, or in special 
education—enrollment rates in the city’s charter el-
ementary schools. 
I. THE ENROLLMENT GAP
Charter schools—public schools that have been 
granted significant administrative autonomy—have 
expanded rapidly. As of the 2011–12 school year, 
nearly 8 percent of students in American cities at-
tended a charter.2 In some urban areas, charter en-
rollment rivals that of traditional district schools. As 
of 2013–14, there were 43 school districts in which 
at least 20 percent of students were enrolled in char-
ters, including Detroit (55 percent of students en-
rolled in charters), Philadelphia (30 percent), Los 
Angeles (21 percent), and Houston (21 percent).3
As charters have grown more popular, concern over 
ensuring equitable access for disadvantaged students 
has also grown, among friends as well as foes of 
charters.4 The president of New York City’s teach-
ers’ union, for example, has argued that the state 
should not increase its cap on charters until charters 
serve similar proportions of disadvantaged students 
as district schools.5 Previously, New York State’s leg-
islature revised its charter-school law to require that 
charter authorizers consider whether charters make 
satisfactory efforts to enroll and retain disadvan-
taged students.6
Many observers assert that the primary driver for 
student-enrollment differences between charters 
and nearby district schools is that charters system-
atically “push out” low-performing or otherwise dif-
ficult-to-educate students, in order to inflate their 
test scores—and, thus, improve their position in 
school rankings.7 Empirical research suggests that 
such fears are, at the very least, greatly exaggerated. 
Indeed, recent studies find that low-performing stu-
dents are just as likely to leave district schools as 
charters;8 and students with disabilities and those 
learning English are as likely, or less likely, to exit 
charters as district schools.9 
Instead, such enrollment gaps are primarily pro-
duced by the fact that not all parents seek admission 
for their children to charters. In New York City, for 
instance, the enrollment gap for English-language 
learners is nearly entirely explained by the fact that 
such students are particularly unlikely to apply to 
attend charters in transition grades—typically, en-
tering kindergarten; entering middle school (sixth 
grade); and entering high school (ninth grade).10
II. APPLYING TO CHARTERS
Unlike district schools, charters rely on students to 
apply for admission. Families may choose not to ap-
ply to charters for numerous reasons: parents may 
be unaware of charters’ availability; parents may be 
insufficiently motivated to apply; parents with chil-
dren requiring special ed might fear that charters 
lack the necessary resources to properly assist their 
kids; and parents may fear that some charters may 
be unwelcoming to their children. 
One such factor affecting charter enrollment that 
policymakers directly control is the ease of apply-
ing. In theory, because applicants are enrolled in 
charters via random lottery, all eligible students who 
wish to attend a particular charter have an equal op-
portunity to do so. In reality, there are application 
barriers—albeit less restrictive than the residential 
barriers to attending a preferred district school—
that are more easily overcome by more involved and 
informed parents. 
To apply, parents must know that charters are avail-
able. Parents must understand the application pro-
cess. Lower-income parents, parents who do not 
speak English fluently, or those with children re-
quiring special ed might not understand the avail-
able choices to the same extent as other parents. A 
recent survey of parents in several school districts 
with expanding charter sectors, including Denver, 
found that parents with less education and those 
with children with disabilities have particular dif-
ficulty determining if their children are eligible to 
attend charters.11 
At present, in the vast majority of school systems, 
the procedure to apply to a charter is separate from 
that for enrolling in a district school. Adding a sepa-
Narrowing the Charter-Enrollment Gap
3
rate application process increases the layers of bu-
reaucracy required to apply to a charter. While stu-
dents are automatically assigned to a district school 
based on residence, they must apply individually to 
each charter in which they wish to enroll. Families 
with greater informational resources and bureau-
cratic acumen might be more likely to successfully 
navigate these extra steps.
Indeed, many cities require families to research and 
understand complicated charter-application pro-
cesses—with multiple forms, deadlines, and rules. 
Families that are nonnative English speakers face 
obvious challenges, while new immigrant fami-
lies may also be unfamiliar with the idea of school 
choice. Recent research further confirms that the 
charter-application process poses challenges even 
for families without language barriers: parents with 
less education are more likely to report difficulty 
in navigating deadlines, multiple applications, and 
sorting out their child’s eligibility for schools.12 
III. COMMON ENROLLMENT
Recently, some U.S. cities have centralized their 
enrollment process to allow families to apply to 
multiple charter or district schools by submitting a 
single annual application. A central system then as-
signs students to schools by lottery, accounting for 
students’ preferences, using an algorithm not sus-
ceptible to manipulation.
Denver, this paper’s focus, adopted common enroll-
ment in 2012–13. Each spring, Denver parents can 
now list up to five preferred schools on a single ap-
plication form. Parents who prefer their children to 
remain in their current school do not have to sub-
mit the form; students in transition grades who do 
not submit a form are automatically assigned to a 
nearby district school.
Denver’s charter-application process is two-sided: 
parents and schools list their preferences. The latter 
can list preferences for students based on attributes 
approved by the school district: some prefer the sib-
lings of currently enrolled students; others prefer 
students from certain neighborhoods. 
Next, an algorithm matches students with charters. 
The matching process continues until there are more 
students in a charter’s preference category than there 
are available seats—at which point, students in the 
preference category are assigned by lottery. Students 
are then assigned to their highest-preference schools 
among those that matched. There is broad partici-
pation in Denver’s common-enrollment system, 
particularly in transition grades. As many as 80 per-
cent of Denver students in transition grades submit 
the form, of which about 83 percent are matched 
with a top-five choice.13 
Importantly, Denver supplemented the adoption 
of common enrollment with measures to assist par-
ents, including publishing a school guide, sponsor-
ing parent-resource centers, and creating a website 
to help parents compare schools.14 This paper’s find-
ings should thus be considered as an empirical anal-
ysis of a common-enrollment system supplemented 
with useful, city-sponsored informational tools.
Under Denver’s common-enrollment system, stu-
dents with individual education plans (IEP) indi-
cating a mild or moderate disability are treated no 
differently from other students. However, during 
the years analyzed in this paper, students with more 
severe disabilities were assigned directly by the dis-
trict to schools deemed able to provide the neces-
sary services.15 Also, if transportation assistance is 
included in students’ IEP, such students are eligible 
to participate in the common-enrollment process 
but on the condition that such assistance may be 
relinquished if the students select a school beyond a 
particular area.16
Common enrollment is a practical application 
of the matching-markets technique pioneered by 
Nobel-winning economist Alvin Roth;17 today, this 
technique is also used to assign donor kidneys and 
match medical students to residencies. In New York 
City and Boston, common enrollment was not in-
troduced to boost charter enrollment among disad-
vantaged youth but to allow more students to realize 
their first-choice schools, as well as to make applica-
tions “strategy-proof” (i.e., students would not be 
penalized for revealing their true preferences).18
As discussed, by making application to charters 
easier, common enrollment likely encourages more 
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applications. New Orleans’s “One App” common-
enrollment form emphasizes the system’s simplicity. 
Another, less obvious, benefit of common enroll-
ment may be to make disadvantaged parents more 
aware that charters are indeed open to their kids—
surveys suggest that parents are often uncertain 
about charter eligibility. To the extent that some 
charters discourage disadvantaged students from 
applying under school-based enrollment systems, 
common enrollment would help reduce such inap-
propriate behavior by eliminating direct contact, 
during the application process, between parents 
and schools.
Recent surveys have indeed found that Den-
ver’s common enrollment reduced confusion in 
the enrollment process, particularly for less edu-
cated parents.19 In the first year following adop-
tion, the percentage of parents with a high 
school education or less who reported having 
“difficulty with the number of applications” de-
creased, from 22 percent to 14 percent, and the 
percentage reporting “difficulty with deadlines” de-
creased, from 28 percent to 20 percent. For parents 
with a bachelor’s degree or higher, the declines were 
15 percent to 9 percent and 17 percent to 12 per-
cent, respectively.
IV.  CONCERNS ABOUT  
COMMON ENROLLMENT 
Moving to common enrollment that is inclusive of 
charters raises important questions that affect both 
the charter and district sectors. While this paper ex-
amines one such question, it is worth noting that a 
substantial change to the enrollment process could 
have numerous consequences and affect different 
stakeholders in different ways. Section IV considers 
some of these issues.20
Start with the widespread distrust between the char-
ter and district sectors in some cities: charter-school 
operators, which greatly value their autonomy, are of-
ten wary of participating in a centralized process that 
links them to the district-school bureaucracy. Many 
charter operators fret that a centralized application 
process will, inevitably, be used as a backdoor route 
to more outside meddling in how charters are run.
Another concern involves whether local district-
school bureaucracies would fairly and efficiently 
execute the common-enrollment process. Because 
charters rely on enrollment for revenue, operators 
worry that ceding control of enrollment would ex-
pose charters to unnecessary delays and other po-
tentially costly mistakes. (This fear might be allayed 
by assigning an independent auditor—determined 
by a central board with representatives from the 
district and charter sectors—to oversee the agreed 
algorithm and lottery.)
For their part, parents may find an algorithm-based 
application process confusing, at least initially. 
When New Orleans adopted common enrollment, 
some parents even sought to manipulate—to their 
children’s detriment—the (tamper-proof ) lottery by 
listing fewer school preferences than mandated. It 
might also be argued that requiring parents to make 
extra effort to apply to charters allows the latter to 
better provide a lifeline to motivated students. Simi-
larly, parents with the resources and ability to navi-
gate (traditional) school-based enrollment might be 
wary of changing a system in which they thrive.
Yet these sentiments are at odds with charters’ oft-
stated declarations that, as public schools, charters 
should be open to—and, indeed, should target—
the most disadvantaged students. This paper does 
not assess all the pros and cons of common enroll-
ment but instead answers an important question: 
To what extent did common enrollment boost 
charter enrollment of disadvantaged kids in a major 
U.S. city?
V. FINDINGS
The analysis focuses on the enrollment patterns 
of entering kindergarten students. The analysis is 
restricted to elementary schools because Denver 
operated too few charter middle and high schools 
during the sample period to allow for significantly 
powered estimation. The sample is restricted to kin-
dergarten because it is the most common elementary 
entry grade.21
Figure 1 examines enrollment patterns for enter-
ing kindergartners for Denver’s charter and district 
schools in 2011–12, the year before the city adopted 
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common enrollment. Figure 1 reveals that Denver’s 
charter elementary schools enrolled lower percent-
ages of disadvantaged students than district schools 
(except for minority students, where the percentage 
was the same).
In his analysis of Denver’s common-enrollment 
system, the author utilizes a 2009–10 through 
2013–14 student data set for charters and district 
schools—including demographic- and service-clas-
sification information—provided by the Denver 
Public Schools’ authority. This paper’s analysis fo-
cuses on enrollments, not applications, because en-
rollment is likely more policy-relevant and because 
the data do not include information on applications 
before Denver’s adoption of common enrollment.22 
Figure 2. Entering Kindergarten Students, by Classification and Sector
Source: Author’s analysis of Denver Public Schools data
 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 
Individual Education Plans—
Charters 
Minority—Charters 
Free/Reduced-Price Lunch—
Charters 
English as a Second Language—
Charters 
Individual Education Plans—
District Schools 
Minority—District Schools 
Free/Reduced-Price Lunch—
District Schools 
English as a Second Language—
District Schools 
District Charter
Eligible for Free/Reduced-Price Lunch 70.6% 64.9%
Minority 74.3% 74.2%
Special Education 7.2% 5.4%
Bilingual/ESL 33.7% 25.6%
Number of Schools 88 12
Figure 1. Entering Kindergarten Students, Charter and District Schools, %, 2011–12*
* Includes only students observed in school for the first time in 2011–12. Numbers differ from those reported in Figure 2 because data 
include all schools, not only schools open as of 2011–12.
Source: Author’s analysis of Denver Public Schools data
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The spread of new charters in Denver during the 
period scrutinized complicates the analysis because 
their creation was unlikely to have been influenced 
by the adoption of common enrollment. For this 
reason, the analysis herein focuses on enrollment 
trends at schools in operation at least two years be-
fore common enrollment took effect:23 the final, 
main estimation sample includes kindergarten en-
rollments at 89 district schools and ten charters, 
open as of 2010–11; the main analysis, covering 
2010–11 through 2013–14, covers two years before 
and two years after Denver’s adoption of common 
enrollment in 2012–13. And, as discussed later, 
the author uses a type of differences-in-differences 
(DD) methodology.
Figure 2 shows the percentage of entering kinder-
garten students, by relevant classification, in charter 
and district schools. Solid lines represent enrollment 
in district schools; dashed lines represent enrollment 
in charters; and the vertical line represents Denver’s 
final year, 2011–12, of school-based enrollment.
Figure 2 shows that district schools experienced 
little change in enrollment patterns. At charters, 
however, enrollment rates for disadvantaged stu-
dents—most prominently, minority and ESL stu-
dents—rose sharply after Denver adopted common 
enrollment. To account for heterogeneity across 
schools, to quantify magnitude, and to provide sig-
nificance testing for the relationships observed in 
Figure 2, the author estimates the following regres-
sion model (Equation 1):
In Equation 1, %Classifiedst represents the percent-
age of students entering school; s, in the fall of year; t, 
students who are identified as having a relevant clas-
sification (minority, eligible for free/reduced-priced 
lunch, special ed, bilingual/ESL); Charter indicates 
whether the school is a charter school; δ is a school-
fixed effect; λ is a year-specific effect; Post indicates 
whether the year is after Denver’s adoption of com-
mon enrollment; ε is a stochastic term clustered by 
school; and β1 represents the differential relation-
ship, between the school being a charter and the per-
centage of students in a particular classification, that 
occurs after adoption of common enrollment.24
This paper does not use a typical DD methodology. 
The typical DD methodology compares the differ-
ence, from previous trends, for a group that received 
a treatment with that of a comparison group that 
did not receive the treatment; in this paper’s DD 
methodology, both charter and district schools si-
multaneously receive the treatment (participating 
in common enrollment). The latter approach allows 
one to determine if Denver’s adoption of common 
enrollment resulted in higher percentages of disad-
vantaged students entering charters relative to dis-
trict schools.25
Assumptions
To interpret β1 as the causal effect of common en-
rollment on the proportion of disadvantaged stu-
dents entering charters, one must assume that de-
viations from previous enrollment trends were not 
influenced by unobserved factors that happened 
contemporaneously with Denver’s adoption of 
common enrollment. As discussed, one such factor 
would be the creation of new charters during the 
period scrutinized. Given that charters vary consid-
erably, newly created charters might well have dif-
ferent enrollment patterns from existing charters—
hence the decision to include only schools open at 
least two years before the city’s adoption of common 
enrollment.
This paper also assumes that enrollment trends be-
fore Denver’s adoption of common enrollment were 
the same for charters and district schools. With the 
exception of minority students, this assumption is 
supported by the flat lines before adoption (Figure 
2) and confirmed by t-tests, which (again, with the 
exception of minority students) find no significant 
difference between charter and district schools in 
2010–11. As for minority students, the pre-com-
mon-enrollment trend for charters is negative (Fig-
ure 2), suggesting that any bias of the estimated 
policy effect is likely downward.
Figure 3 offers results from estimating Equation 1, 
with the sample restricted both to students enter-
ing kindergarten as well as to schools in operation 
in 2010–11. At the top of columns, the dependent 
%Classifiedst= β0+ δs+ λt+ β1 (Charters *  Postt ) + εst
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variable for each regression is listed. Standard errors, 
clustered by school, are in brackets.
Consistent with Figure 2, Figure 3 suggests that 
Denver’s common-enrollment system increased the 
percentage of disadvantaged students entering char-
ter elementary schools. In each column, the coef-
ficient on the interaction between charter schooling 
and posttreatment years is positive and of meaning-
ful magnitude. In the case of minority and ESL stu-
dents, the relationships are statistically significant. 
In the case of students with disabilities, the relation-
ship is insignificant at reasonable levels. In the case 
of students eligible for free/reduced-price lunches, 
the coefficient estimate is positive and substantial 
but narrowly misses the standard cutoff for statisti-
cal significance (p = 0.169).
The magnitude of the results displayed in Figure 3 
is meaningful, too—suggesting that common en-
rollment boosted bilingual/ESL student enrollment 
in charters by 5.35 percentage points. In 2011–12, 
among schools included in the sample, 33.7 percent 
of students entering district schools and 25.6 per-
cent of students entering charters were bilingual/
ESL speakers (Figure 2). Thus, as a result of com-
mon enrollment, such students—a group frequent-
ly targeted by policymakers for increased charter 
enrollment—–virtually closed the enrollment gap 
between charters and district schools among stu-
dents entering kindergarten.
Figure 3. Regression Results: Kindergarten Entrants^
^Model estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS). Sample includes observations from 2010–11 through 2013–14. *p-value <= 0.10 **p-
value <= 0.05 ***p-value <= 0.01
Source: Author’s analysis of Denver Public Schools data
  
Dependent Variable % Free/Reduced-Price Lunch % Minority % Special Ed % Bilingual/ESL
2010–11
0.0122
[0.0110]
0.00481
[0.00923]
0.00342
[0.00887]
-0.00266
[0.0134]
2011–12
0.0127
[0.00944]
0.00313
[0.00814]
-0.00170
[0.00875]
-0.0105
[0.0127]
2012-13
0.0176*
[0.00963]
0.00893
[0.00790]
0.00480
[0.00622]
0.0287**
[0.0125]
Charter * Post 
0.0482
[0.0334]
0.0557***
[0.0193]
0.00860
[0.0135]
0.0535*
[0.0308]
Constant
0.685***
[0.00674]
0.737***
[0.00553]
0.0711***
[0.00553]
0.337***
[0.00867]
School-Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 382 382 382 382
R-squared 0.976 0.976 0.515 0.924
Total Schools 99 99 99 99
Charter Schools 10 10 10 10
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CoNCluSioN
This paper uses a modified DD methodology to de-
termine whether Denver’s adoption of common en-
rollment increased the enrollment of disadvantaged 
students in the city’s charter elementary schools 
relative to district elementary schools. It finds that 
common enrollment increased the percentage of 
disadvantaged students who were minorities, eligi-
ble for free/reduced-price lunches, or bilingual/ESL 
speakers—but not those with disabilities.
Given that policymakers frequently express a par-
ticularly ardent desire to boost the charter enroll-
ment of students with disabilities, this latter result 
is disappointing. Nevertheless, this result was likely 
influenced by the fact that Denver’s school district 
placed additional restrictions on the ability of stu-
dents with severe disabilities—as well as those with 
an IEP requiring the district to provide transporta-
tion services—to participate in the common-enroll-
ment system. But the most important limitation of 
this paper’s analyses is the relatively small number 
of charters included in the estimation sample. The 
estimates produced are precise enough to detect 
meaningful magnitudes, but similar analysis of oth-
er large U.S. cities that have more recently adopted 
common enrollment would shine further light on 
the topic.
As for policy implications, common-enrollment 
systems that include charters will likely expand dis-
advantaged students’ enrollment in charter schools. 
This finding is particularly important, given recent 
research suggesting that the widely noted enroll-
ment gaps between charter and district schools are 
predominantly determined by who enters charters, 
not who exits them.26 Policies, such as common en-
rollment, that facilitate application to charters thus 
offer the most promise of narrowing such gaps.
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only able to state a preference for schools that the district has determined have the ability to provide them 
with adequate services.
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19 Gross, DeArmond, and Denice 2015.
20 Many of these issues have been discussed in greater detail in a series of papers by the Center for 
Reinventing Public Education.
21 Results are robust to including additional grade levels in elementary schools. Results are also similar when 
the analysis includes entry into the sixth and ninth grades—common entry grades in middle and high 
school.
22 To test robustness, the author also ran models that included all students entering elementary school, in 
kindergarten through fifth grade. The results were comparable with those reported.
23 Though not discussed, the author found similar results when different specifications were used.
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24 Estimates are similar when the model is estimated with student-level data. School-level data are used 
for the main analysis because the school is the level of treatment. Further, since individual students are 
not observed entering kindergarten in both pre- and post-policy states, the differences-in-differences 
procedure is difficult to interpret when applied to the student level.
25 Such an approach does not address the (unlikely) possibility that common enrollment brought new 
students into Denver’s total student pool.
26 Winters 2014, 2015B; Roy 2014.

CeNteR foR State aND 
loCal leaDeRShip 
Isaac Gorodetski
Director
Charles Sahm
Education Policy Director
Dean Ball
Manager
fellowS
Rick Baker
Daniel DiSalvo 
Richard C. Dreyfuss
Stephen D. Eide
Nicole Gelinas
Edward Glaeser 
George Kelling
Steven Malanga 
Josh B. McGee
Edmund J. McMahon
Aaron M. Renn 
Fred Siegel
Jacob Vigdor
Marcus A. Winters
The Manhattan Institute’s Center for State and Local Leadership (CSLL) promotes 
promising new approaches to reform of state and local government. CSLL works on a broad 
range of issues, including public sector reform (specifically of pensions and health benefits), 
education, prisoner reentry, policing, public housing, infrastructure, immigration, and 
public-service delivery. By spotlighting new ideas and providing the research and proposals 
to inform creative new policies, CSLL hopes to lay the groundwork for an environment in 
which commerce, employment, and a rich civic life can flourish. 
CSLL operates across the country, working in states such as California, Illinois, and Rhode 
Island, and cities such as Newark, New Jersey, and Detroit, Michigan. CSLL’s tools include 
regular writing and research reports by affiliated Manhattan Institute scholars and senior 
fellows, along with public events and media appearances. CSLL also annually hosts both 
the James Q. Wilson Lecture on Urban Affairs—a forum for distinguished policymakers 
and scholars to explore the challenges and opportunities facing American cities—and the 
Manhattan Institute’s Social Entrepreneurship Awards, which recognize those who identify 
social needs and take it upon themselves to address them privately.
www.manhattan-institute.org/csll
The Manhattan Institute is a 501(C)(3) nonprofit organization. Contributions are tax-
deductible to the fullest extent of the law. EIN #13-2912529
